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During the year to end-January 2005, the resurgence of takeover activity 
in the mobile telecommunications industry 1 has attracted media 
attention. However, by focusing on takeovers, the willingness of companies 
in the sector to collaborate through alliance and joint venture formation is in 
danger of being overlooked. These alliances, none of which are more than 
two years old, can be variously interpreted. They could signify a return to 
expansionary behaviour by operators motivated by the desire to capture 
lucrative roaming traffic or retain key customers. Alternatively the alliances 
may be motivated by the desire to compete more effectively with Vodafone, 
which is arguably the only mobile operator with a global footprint.  
But are these alliances more likely to survive than their largely fixed-wire 
predecessors? Concert, Global One and AT&T-Unisource all floundered for 
a variety of reasons (CHAN-OLMSTED & JAMISON, 2003; CURWEN, 1999 and 
2001). In the case of Concert, neither AT&T nor BT viewed Concert as a 
business in its own right, but rather as a means to generate additional 
revenue (CURWEN & WHALLEY, 2004, p. 81), while Global One imploded in 
the aftermath of Deutsche Telekom's unilateral and ultimately futile bid for 
Telecom Italia in 1999. This alliance, as well as Concert, vividly 
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demonstrates that alliance formation is fraught with difficulties, with those 
companies participating in alliances often having as many reasons to 
compete against one another as they do to collaborate. This suggests that 
the omens for the recently formed alliances are not encouraging. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the initial section, the six alliances 
that have been formed are described. Particular attention is paid to the 
membership and resulting scale of these alliances, as well as to the motives 
for their formation. The first sub-section focuses on those alliances that are 
largely scale orientated in motivation, while the second concentrates on 
those that are more technologically orientated. These alliances are then 
discussed in detail and conclusions are drawn.   
Mobile alliances 
Scale driven alliances 
In April 2003, Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM), Telefónica Móviles and T-
Mobile formed a partnership within Europe – one more akin to an alliance 
than a joint venture - to improve cross-border customer services with the 
particular intention of providing better competition for Vodafone. It was 
significant that no cross-shareholdings were either taken or anticipated. 
Orange subsequently joined, and the footprint of the alliance, which markets 
itself as FreeMove, can be seen in table 1. In April 2004, FreeMove 
announced that it would be launching a new data-roaming tariff in the 
summer, as well as a branded laptop data card and facilities to recharge pre-
paid cards, change handsets and change subscriber identity module (SIM) 
cards while abroad. 
With all of the major European operators now tied up, the smaller 
operators clearly needed to respond. As a result, in October 2003, the 
Mobile Alliance was formed between mmO2 in the UK, ONE in Austria, Wind 
in Italy, Amena in Spain, Telenor Mobile in Norway, Pannon GSM in 
Hungary (owned by Telenor) and TDC Schweiz in Switzerland. This planned 
to introduce cross-border roaming with common short codes and pre-pay 
top-ups abroad. Business users would be offered flat-rate plans for usage 
across all of the networks. The alliance announced that it would use the 
brand name 'Starmap Mobile Alliance' in February 2004, at which point 
GPRS and MMS roaming was available, with co-operation extending to the 
definition and development of 3G handsets. 
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Meanwhile, an alliance of sorts – it has specifically chosen not to use the 
term so far – was being created by DoCoMo in order to roll out its i-mode 
version of 2.5G. This initially involved taking minority stakes in its i-mode 
partners, but this proved to be uneconomic so DoCoMo reverted to 
persuasion. DoCoMo's big problem was that all of the major operators 
already had their own versions of portals based upon 2.5G and hence could 
see little point in going along with i-mode. A particular disappointment was 
Hutchison 3G UK's refusal to play along, leading to rumours that DoCoMo 
would switch to mmO2, the only other available possibility in the UK.  
Outside Europe there was relatively little activity until the latter part of 
2004, although in mid-2003, HK-CSL, Maxis, MobileOne, Smart 
Communications and Telstra formed the Asia Mobility Initiative (AMI) – note 
the absence of 'alliance' in the title - to "provide subscribers with easier 
access". The AMI is strictly non-exclusive. Meanwhile, Korea Telecom, 
China Netcom, Maxis, StarHub and Telstra had signed a MoU in March to 
form the world's first wireless broadband alliance for the development of W-
LANs/Wi-Fi. This Wireless Broadband Alliance would utilise the existing 
network of 8,600 hotspots and expand these to a total of over 20,000 by the 
end of 2003. Most recently, in November 2004, seven Asia-Pacific-based 
mobile operators – Bharti (India), Globe Telecom (Philippines), Maxis 
(Malaysia), Optus (Australia), SingTel, Taiwan Cellular and Telkomsel 
(Indonesia) - announced the formation of the Bridge Mobile Alliance seeking 
to achieve economies of scale for its members. In addition, a Singapore-
based subsidiary, Bridge Mobile, will be a commercial vehicle in which the 
members will invest to build and establish a regional mobile infrastructure 
and common service platform, enabling the creation and seamless delivery 
of mobile services across national borders. 
A final scale driven alliance worthy of note is the Wireless Broadband 
Alliance, initially set up by five operators in 2003 as part of an effort to drive 
roaming between Wi-Fi hotspots. By October 2004, membership of the WBA 
had expanded to 25, all being operators fulfilling the requirement that they 
have a significant market presence in their respective regions, a large 
number of subscribers and a core network separate from their Wi-Fi offering. 
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Technology driven alliances 
On the one hand, individual operators have somewhat different hardware 
and software requirements. On the other hand, anything is preferable to 
ongoing destructive competition, and this thought appears to be behind the 
appearance of alliances designed to assist operators in general in the face 
of common difficulties. Thus, for example, the Fixed-[to-]Mobile 
Convergence Alliance was formed in June 2004 between NTT 
Communications, the BT Group, Swisscom, Korea Telecom, Brasil Telecom 
and Rogers Wireless, shortly thereafter to be joined by others (see table 1). 
The purpose behind the alliance was to promote combined fixed and mobile 
services at a time when combining them both in one handset with joint billing 
had become a technical reality.  
Fixed operators wanted to limit the loss of customers to mobile-only 
telephony, while mobile operators wanted to develop new devices that would 
avoid the imminent onset of market saturation. There was no intention to try 
to use their combined bargaining power to drive down handset prices, but 
rather a desire to influence equipment manufacturers to develop the 
technology that operators felt that they needed.  
A similar type of alliance was formed in June 2004 with a view to 
formulating a common user interface (UI) to be introduced in all types of 
device. Membership of the Open Mobile Terminals Platform (OMTP) alliance 
was originally to be restricted to operators, thereby putting pressure upon 
equipment manufacturers to fall into line without having a direct say in 
developments. It was claimed that the objective was not to dictate which 
operating system was to be used, but rather to define a minimum set of UI 
features for equipment manufacturers to incorporate. The ultimate point of 
the exercise was avowedly to make it easier for customers to switch 
networks and devices without suffering technophobia (MIDDLETON, 2004). 
However, in October 2004 not only was sponsorship forthcoming from Nokia 
and Motorola, but the founding OMTP members were joined by 
manufacturers such as Philips Electronics and STMicroelectronics and 
software firms including Esmertec and Savaje.     
Discussion 
The first observation that can be made is that the geographical scale of 
the alliances outlined above displays considerable variation. The 
geographical scope of two alliances – Starmap and Bridge – is purely 
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regional – at least for now. Starmap does not have a presence outside of 
Europe, whereas Asian mobile operators formed Bridge.  
A second observation is that the membership of the alliances is largely 
composed of operating companies. This is true even for the technology 
driven alliances such as the Fixed-[to-]Mobile Convergence Alliance. Other 
companies were initially excluded from The Open Mobile Terminals Platform 
alliance, but this was later reversed, perhaps once the enormity of the task 
set was understood. A closer inspection of alliance membership leads onto a 
third observation, namely, that some of the alliances are centred around a 
single company whereas others have no dominant company. The i-mode 
'alliance' aptly illustrates the former, and FreeMove and Starmap the latter. 
The Starmap alliance contains a handful of European mobile companies that 
are all of modest size. The absence of geographical overlap provides 
Starmap with a key competitive advantage: its members are more likely to 
agree on common strategies, products and services as they are not 
competing against one another in the same market.  
Not only is there more overlap between the members of the FreeMove 
alliance, but the alliance also contains at least two mobile operators – T-
Mobile and Orange – that have aspirations at the pan-European, if not 
global, level. The operation of this alliance, therefore, is likely to be fraught 
with difficulties. In the first place, both companies are likely to see 
themselves as the natural leader of the alliance and may act accordingly. 
Furthermore, because they both have pan-European aspirations, each will 
only remain a willing participant in the alliance as long as there is no conflict 
between its own strategy and that of the alliance. As a consequence, 
FreeMove will probably develop in one of two ways: either it will remain as 
nothing more than a loose collaborative arrangement without developing into 
something more formal or it will collapse in acrimony as its larger members 
seek to impose their views.  
The ability of the larger scale driven alliances – FreeMove, Starmap and 
i-mode – to compete against Vodafone is questionable. These alliances 
stand in stark contrast with the strategy that Vodafone has adopted, which in 
essence has been one of avoiding collaboration wherever possible. In those 
markets where Vodafone live! has been launched, in all but four countries it 
is delivered over a network that is also owned by Vodafone and in three of 
these four countries Vodafone has a minority stake in the network. This 
should not be taken as suggesting that Vodafone has never established a 
joint venture – many of its initial international investments took the form of 
joint ventures where Vodafone, in most cases, subsequently took majority if 
174     
not outright control (CURWEN, 2002; CURWEN & WHALLEY, 2004). Equally, its 
main tactic in smaller, peripheral markets is to sign a Network Partner 
Agreement with the incumbent whereby the latter markets its services using 
its own brand name hyphenated to that of Vodafone.  
Conclusions 
In this paper we have identified a number of alliances that have recently 
been formed in the mobile telecommunications industry. Broadly speaking, 
these alliances were motivated by either the desire to achieve scale without 
the need to invest in a series of networks, or by a desire to overcome 
technical problems such as interoperability and roaming.  
Previous attempts at alliance formation on this scale have rarely been 
successful, and have often collapsed amid acrimony. Those alliances with 
more members such as FreeMove, i-mode, Bridge and the Wireless 
Broadband Alliance are likely to suffer from tensions arising from the 
different strategic priorities of the member companies. The failure of 
DoCoMo to persuade its partners to adopt i-mode amply illustrates this 
divergence in practice. To date, counting both Orange and T-Mobile among 
its member companies has not proved too much of a distraction for 
FreeMove. This is, to a lesser or greater degree, due to the financial woes of 
their respective parent companies effectively limiting their ambitions and 
encouraging collaboration, but as these have more or less disappeared it is 
undoubtedly only a matter of time before tensions rise. 
In contrast to FreeMove are Starmap and Vodafone live! The lack of 
overlap among Starmap members, and their relatively limited individual 
footprints, reduces the opportunity for tensions to arise. Moreover, the 
ambitions of Starmap are relatively modest and would appear to benefit 
equally all alliance members. Vodafone live! combines a largely Vodafone 
controlled footprint with some collaborative partnerships.  Such collaboration 
enables Vodafone live! to be offered in comparatively small markets without 
Vodafone having first to acquire a network, as well as address its strategic 
difficulties. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which have prevented 
Vodafone live! from being launched in the United States, Vodafone has been 
able to co-ordinate the launch of services, as well as centralise the purchase 
of handsets. The additional (roaming) traffic that this generates for the 
collaborative partners, as well as cheaper handsets, ensure that they are 
prepared to follow Vodafone's lead.  
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Europe        
Albania - - - AMC - - - 
Austria Mobilkom Orange /  
T-Mobile 
ONE - - - T-Mobile 
Belgium Proximus3 Orange - Base - - - 
Bulgaria - - - GloBul3 - - - 
Croatia VIPnet T-Mobile - - - - - 
Czech Rep. - T-Mobile/TIM EuroTel - - EuroTel  T-Mobile 
Denmark - - Telenor - - - - 
France SFR Orange - Bouygues - Cégétel - 
Germany Vodafone T-Mobile mmO2 E-Plus - - T-Mobile 
Greece Vodafone TIM - CosmOTE - - - 
Hungary Vodafone T-Mobile Telenor - - - - 
Ireland Vodafone - mmO2 - - - - 
Italy Vodafone TIM Wind Wind - - Telecom 
Italia 
Lithuania BitéGSM - - - - - - 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - 
Macedonia - T-Mobile - Cosmofon3 - - - 
Malta Vodafone - - - - - - 
Netherlands Vodafone Orange / 
T-Mobile 
- KPN - - T-Mobile 
Norway - - Telenor - - - - 
Poland - Orange / 
T-Mobile 
- - - - - 
Portugal Vodafone Orange - - - - - 
Romania - Orange - - - - - 
Russia - T-Mobile - - - - - 
Slovakia - Orange / 
T-Mobile 
- - - - - 
Slovenia Si-Mobil - - - - - - 
Spain Vodafone Telefónica Amena Telefónica5 - - - 
Sweden Vodafone - - - - - - 
Switzerland Swisscom Orange TDC 
Schweiz 
- - Swisscom  - 
UK Vodafone Orange / 
T-Mobile 
mmO2 -6 - BT Group BT / 
T-Mobile 
Elsewhere        
Australia Vodafone - - Telstra Telstra Telstra Telstra 
Brazil - Telefónica / 
TIM4 
- - - Brasil Telecom - 
Canada - - - - - Rogers W'less - 
Caribbean - - - -7 - - - 
China - - - - - - Netcom 
Egypt Vodafone Orange - - - - - 
Hong Kong SmarTone - - -8 Telstra - Telstra 
Japan Vodafone - - DoCoMo - NTTC/DoCoMo NTT 
Comms 
Macau  - - - - CTM - - 
Malaysia - - - - Maxis - Maxis  
Morocco - Telefónica - - - - - 
New Zealand Vodafone - - - - - - 












Philippines - - - - Smart - PLDT / 
Smart 
Singapore - - - StarHub MobileOne - StarHub 
South Korea - - - - - Korea Telecom KT 
Telecom 
Taiwan - - - Far 
EasTone 
- - - 
Thailand - Orange - - DTAC - True 
Turkey - TIM - - - - - 
USA - T-Mobile - - - - T-Mobile 
Notes:  1 Orange is also active in Jordan, Moldova and a number of African countries such as Cameroon and 
Côte d'Ivoire.  2 Although these are the countries officially listed, Telenor is also present in Albania, 
Bangladesh, Denmark, Malaysia, Montenegro, Russia, Thailand and the Ukraine. 3 Agreed but not launched. 
4 Both Telefónica and TIM have extensive interests in Latin America. In Brazil, Telefónica operates a 50/50 
joint venture with Portugal Telecom called Vivo. 5 Telefónica does not use the i-mode brand but rather 
incorporates the additional features offered by the technology into its existing e-moción WAP-based data 
service. 6 DoCoMo has agreed to sell its stake in H3G in order to seek an alternative partner willing to launch 
i-mode in the UK. 7 AT&T Wireless provided a somewhat half-hearted service known as mMode which 
reflected the 16 per cent stake held by DoCoMo. However, DoCoMo sold its stake in October 2004 to 
Cingular Wireless so the future of mMode is in doubt. 8 Hutchison allegedly intends to introduce it. 
 
 
